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Let's begin with the very idea of a "new paradigm": are there distinc-
tive ideas organizing our particular proposals, and if so, what are they? Our
commentators profess varying degrees of skepticism, and we hope to allay
their doubts with a two-part answer. The first emphasizes principle; the
second is more pragmatic. We begin with a framework that isolates our
basic normative concerns; we continue with an instrumental assessment of
the "secret donation booth" as a policy tool; we conclude by asking
whether these principled and pragmatic perspectives provide the basis for a
"new paradigm"-a distinctive and coherent approach to the problem of
campaign finance.
FOUR PRINCIPLES OF CITIZEN ENGAGEMENT
Four distinct but interrelated principles define our project: political
autonomy, citizen sovereignty, equality, and responsiveness. These princi-
ples converge on a final goal: to encourage Americans to take their citi-
zenship seriously and cast their ballots in a relatively considered fashion.
A. Political Autonomy
Our first aim is to establish the autonomy of the political sphere. Le-
gitimate politics is more than the pursuit of private self-interest. Politics
gains autonomy to the extent participants can credibly view it as an attempt
to elaborate the public good and not merely the private interests with
dominant factions.'
The collective aspiration toward political autonomy is expressed, in
America at least, through the language of private citizenship. When
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ordinary people call themselves private citizens, they present themselves as
complex creatures capable of responding to two different questions: What
is good for me? What is good for the country?
Within the sphere of private life, each private citizen has the right to
act primarily on the basis of her answer to the first question, but not in the
public sphere. Here the polity demands something more. It asks each pri-
vate citizen to look beyond her private interest and make a good-faith effort
to orient herself to the public good. 2
Professor David Strauss affirms this basic understanding of citizen-
ship responsibility and rightly asserts that it serves as the basis for making
political corruption into a crime.3 If a businessman hands over a million
dollars to a congressman in exchange for his vote on a tax break, the bribe
substitutes for any good-faith effort to persuade the representative that the
tax break is in the public interest. The congressman simply takes the
money and suspends his public-regarding point of view. As a consequence,
the transaction offends the autonomy principle, and it is appropriately
criminalized in any political regime that seeks to preserve its aspirations to
define public, and not merely private, interests.
Strauss joins us in rejecting economistic efforts to reduce political
motivations to the narrow pursuit of self-interest.4 Nonetheless, he asks
whether the autonomy principle is overextended when applied to campaign
contributions. After all, the donor's money no longer goes into the con-
gressman's private pocket, but into his public campaign chest. Isn't this
difference significant enough to make such "deals" a legitimate part of the
political process?
It depends on the context. Consider an all-too-common case: a firm
or industry gives money to both major party candidates to ensure that its
private interests are protected regardless of the outcome of the race.' Such
a strategy makes a mockery of the autonomy principle: the firm is not en-
gaged in a good-faith effort to support its notion of the public good, but
2. See generally BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS ch. 9 (1991)
[hereinafter ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS] (discussing the theory of private citizenship).
3. David A. Strauss, What s the Problem? Ackerman and Ayres on Campaign Finance Reform,
91 CALIF. L. REV 723 (2003).
4. Id. at 727-34.
5. Several industries were among the top ten contributors to each national party in the 1998
elections. For example, lawyers and law firms gave $42.8 million to the Democrats (making them the
largest Democratic Party contributor) and $16.4 million to Republicans (making them the sixth largest
Republican Party contributor). Securities firms gave $17.2 million to Democrats (making them the
second largest Democratic Party contributor) and $19.4 million to Republicans (making them the third
largest Republican Party contributor). The real estate industry contributed $16.5 million to Democrats
(making them the third largest Democratic Party contributor) and $21.1 million to Republicans (making
them the second largest Republican Party contributor). The Center for Responsive Politics, Leading
Industry Contributors to Each Party, at http://www.opensecrets.org/pubs/bigpicture2000/overview/
lead.ihtml (last visited Apr. 13, 2003).
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rather to protect its private interests at all costs. Such a strategy subverts
the autonomy principle.
At the opposite pole are choices made by citizens with the Patriot dol-
lars issued under the new paradigm. Our program structures each citizen's
Patriot decision in a way that virtually guarantees that she is making a
good-faith effort to define the public good. First, an individual gift of $50
is so small that it can't possibly be enough to gain a private favor. Second,
voting with dollars requires personal effort. A voter spends time talking
about the decision with family and friends and walking to the ATM to des-
ignate who will receive the contribution. Why would somebody make this
effort unless she thought she was contributing to the public good?
After all, she could spend that time on private-regarding activities,
like watching TV or mowing the lawn. Indeed, millions of Americans care
so little about the public good that they will fail to vote with their
Patriot dollars and will allow them to expire at the end of the electoral pe-
riod. But these millions of abstentions will emphasize the public-interest
orientation of the Americans who do take the time and trouble to contribute
to their favorite candidates, parties, or interest groups.
To be sure, our program doesn't call upon private citizens to make a
very large sacrifice of their private interests-a few minutes will suffice to
press some buttons on the ATM-and there is no guarantee that the Patriot
holder will spend much thought on his problem in public choice before he
gets to the machine.6 While the Patriot holder may have a superficial view
of the public interest, he would not go to the ATM unless he was motivated
by a public-regarding concern. In contrast, the big business that gives to
both candidates has no such concern. It simply wants to insulate its profits
from the outcome of any and all political debate and decision. The
Patriot gift affirms political autonomy; the business gift denies it.
Strauss's failure to attend to these contextual differences leads to
some misplaced criticism. He finds it puzzling that our proposal allows the
Sierra Club or National Rifle Association to publicize the amount of Patriot
money they give to candidates but denies big private donors a similar
opportunity: "If special-interest deals are a problem, they are a problem
even if they are deals for vouchers." 7
The problem is Strauss's definition of "special-interest deals." He fails
to distinguish between deals that are motivated purely by private self-
interest and deals motivated by an ideal of the public good with which he
disagrees. Only deals of the former sort offend the autonomy principle. For
example, consider a doctor who sincerely believes that massive subsidies
for drug companies are in the public interest. As a consequence, he gives
his fifty Patriots to "Citizens for Preventive Medicine," dedicated to the
6. See infra Part I.E.
7. See Strauss, supra note 3, at 733.
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political support of drug subsidies. We might disagree with the doctor's
judgment and condemn his citizens' group as a "special interest," but this
is hardly enough to condemn the gift under the autonomy principle. After
all, our hypothetical doctor may call us "specially interested" when we give
our Patriot dollars to organizations he opposes. Only efforts to maximize
private interests without regard to any public-regarding commitment vio-
late the autonomy principle!
From this perspective, the "secret donation booth" provides a focused
institutional mechanism for eliminating those campaign gifts that violate
autonomy. Under conditions of full information, the prospect of a big cash
gift encourages a candidate to suspend his concerns about the public inter-
est for the larger goal of fattening his campaign wallet. But there is no
longer a serious risk to political autonomy once it is filtered through the
donation booth. Since the giver can no longer profit personally, the dona-
tion expresses a judgment that a particular candidate's positions further the
public interest. Others may believe that the giver's judgment is silly or stu-
pid or evil. But this does not qualify the giver as indulging a "special inter-
est" in violation of the autonomy principle.
Professor Pam Karlan makes a similar mistake. She points out that the
donation booth will only provide "partial" anonymity. Politicians might not
be able to identify particular donors, but they will hire consultants to de-
termine the aggregate sums contributed by different economic and social
interests. 9
This is correct, but partial anonymity does not violate the autonomy
principle. So long as a politician cannot identify a given donor's gift on an
individual basis, the donor cannot reasonably expect to gain a private quid
pro quo. As a consequence, he will continue giving large sums only when
motivated by public-regarding considerations. Since he cannot obtain spe-
cial favors from the candidate, why would he give a $5,000 donation when
he could spend the money on a weekend in Paris? Anonymous gift giving
does not make sense unless the donor thinks that the candidate, or her posi-
tions, is superior from the public point of view.
Karlan is right to point out that the politician's consultant might be in
a position to tell him that X% of his money comes from constituents earn-
ing more than $150,000 who support drug subsidies and oppose war."
Since the contributions reflect a group's judgment about the public good,
candidates do not breach the autonomy principle by taking them into ac-
count when fashioning their own stands on the issues. Again, candidates
8. See Sunstein, supra note 1, at 82-85 (claiming that representatives should not respond
mechanically to political power or to existing private preferences).
9. See Pamela S. Karlan, Elections and Change Under Voting with Dollars, 91 CALIF. L. REV
705 (2003).
10. Seeid. at 712.
[Vol. 91:743
HeinOnline -- 91 Cal. L. Rev. 746 2003
THE NEW PAJ?4DIGMREVISITED
only violate the autonomy principle when they pander to their constituent's
private interests without filtering them through public-regarding judg-
ments.
B. Citizen Sovereignty
Autonomy is a thin, though fundamental, principle. If political par-
ticipants refuse to accept this constraint on their motivations, they have
failed to create a republic in the classical sense of the word: a res publica.1'
But taken by itself, the principle does not satisfy modem notions of
legitimate government. Ancient republics satisfied autonomy despite the
fact that they were often extremely aristocratic. A small elite made good-
faith efforts to define the common good but excluded everybody else as
unfit for the task. Modem republics repudiate this aristocratic premise and
commit themselves to a universalistic understanding of citizen sovereignty;
all mature citizens should have a say in determining the public good. The
principle of universal suffrage expresses this commitment. The Patriot pro-
gram extends this principle to the domain of campaign finance, allowing
every citizen to use her Patriot dollars during the campaign as well as her
ballot on election day.
Professor Richard Briffault fails to confront the moral dimension of
citizen sovereignty when he compares our plan to familiar tax-subsidy
schemes that match private donations with public dollars on a preset for-
mula.12 These matching schemes do not guarantee that every mature citizen
has a say in campaign finance. They only magnify the contributions of
those who are rich enough to spare some of their private funds for this pur-
pose. Indeed, the evidence suggests that even pure tax credits, which reim-
burse 100% of small contributions, are disproportionately used by middle-
and upper-class contributors who are more willing to wait several months
for the reimbursement. 13 In contrast, our program refuses to force poor
people to sacrifice private consumption to gain a matching grant. It does
not require them to skip dinner if they want to trigger a matching state
grant for the candidate of their choice. Instead, they receive their Patriot
dollars as a matter of right, on the same basis that they receive their ballot
on election day."
11. For valuable reflections on the republican ideal, see, for example, PHILIP PE-rOIT,
REPUBLICANISM: A THEORY OF FREEDOM AND GOVERNMENT (2000), and QUENTIN SKINNER,
LIBERTY BEFORE LIBERALISM (1998).
12. Richard Briffault, Reforming Campaign Finance Reform: A Review of Voting with Dollars,
91 CALIF. L. REV. 643 (2003).
13. See BRUCE ACKERMAN & IAN AYRES, VOTING WITH DOLLARS: A NEW PARADIGM FOR
CAMPAIGN FINANCE 262-63 n.33 (2002).
14. For a further analysis of matching grants, see Bruce Ackerman & Ian Ayers, Why a New
Paradigm, 37 U. RICH. L. REV. 1147,1178-79 (forthcoming 2003).
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The real question is whether this extension of citizen sovereignty is
morally justified. Professors John Ferejohn and David Strauss express
doubts which, if taken seriously, undermine the moral foundations of uni-
versal suffrage no less than those supporting Patriot dollars. They ask
whether ordinary citizens are really up to the task of spending their Patriot
dollars wisely. Will they not ignorantly succumb to the allure of dema-
gogues unconscionably exploiting their ignorance to lead the public down
the primrose path? The same thing can be said about access to the ballot
box. If Patriot holders succumb to demagoguery during the campaign, why
will they not succumb on election day?
Ferejohn worries about the frivolous decisions of ignorant or ideo-
logical citizens. 5 Strauss makes this concern more concrete. He notes that
our present system encourages unscrupulous incumbents to engineer an
"October Surprise" to scare the public into supporting them at the
November election. He suggests that the "biggest risk" of our Patriot pro-
posal is that it will create similar incentives during the campaign, with in-
cumbents generating additional "surprises" to get their supporters rushing
to the ATMs to overwhelm their opponents with Patriot dollars. 6
If the danger of a "surprise" is enough to deny citizens Patriot dollars,
why not deny them ballots as well? Strauss's objection only makes sense if
he believes that existing campaign contributors, who tend to be rich and
well organized, are sober enough to withstand the demagogue's "surprise"
during campaign season. If this is so, should the suffrage be restricted in a
comparable fashion to guarantee that voters will be sober enough to with-
stand the surprise of October? 7
These are not rhetorical questions. Doubts about the sobriety of the
unwashed and unpropertied provided the staple for opposition to universal
suffrage for centuries. The controversy continued throughout the West until
recently, with the United States joining the emerging consensus only with
the Voting Rights Act of 1965.8 It is hardly surprising that identical objec-
tions arise to an extension of the principle of citizen sovereignty to the
campaign season. After all, campaign debate and final vote are merely two
phases of a single, integrated process of democratic deliberation and deci-
sion. If it is no longer politically correct to question the sobriety of the vot-
ers on election day, we may well witness a "return of the repressed" as
15. See John Ferejohn, Playing with House Money: Patriot Dollars Considered, 91 CALIF. L.
REV. 685 (2003).
16. See Strauss, supra note 3.
17. Strauss's anxieties may not make sense, even conceding his moral presuppositions. Despite
his suggestion, it may be better if incumbents tried to generate a large number of "surprises" than if
they held off for a single surprise in October. Didn't somebody once claim that you cannot fool all the
people all the time? Wouldn't voters rebel and vote against an incumbent who was constantly creating
fear and anxiety?
18. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 107-377, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. 1971-1974e (2000)).
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commentators question the capacity of citizens to use their Patriot dollars
wisely.
Ferejohn goes further and seems to reject the entire notion of citizen
sovereignty: "Democracy in a large and heterogeneous nation may not
require the kind of continuous participatory involvement that was (barely)
possible in ancient Athens. Why should people find it a good use of their
time to learn about candidates and issues months before an election?"19
Of course, if we follow Ferejohn and applaud Americans who con-
sider citizenship a waste of time, the notion of citizen sovereignty seems
fatuous. The case for universal suffrage, if there is one, must then be fash-
ioned along the economistic lines originated by Joseph Schumpeter, and
taken up more recently by William Riker.2" On this familiar line, it is a
mistake to think that elections provide a mechanism by which voters actu-
ally determine the broad contours of public policy after considered elec-
toral debate. The real function of elections is much more modest but no
less important. Even if voting outcomes are more or less random, they nev-
ertheless serve the valuable purpose of shaking up established elites and
requiring the "Ins" to give way to the "Outs" from time to time. The forced
circulation of elites, in turn, reduces the chances of tyranny. According to
the Schumpeterians, and apparently the Ferejohnians, this point is enough
to justify universal suffrage without any claptrap about "citizen sover-
eignty."
This is a perfectly respectable intellectual position, which requires
elaborate consideration before one thoughtfully accepts or rejects it. One of
us has devoted the better part of his academic life trying to explain why
Schumpeterianism fails to do justice to the aspirations-of the liberal democ-
ratic tradition in general, and American democracy in particular.21 This is
hardly the place to mount such a critique. But we are hardly surprised that
Ferejohn concludes that we "have fallen short of justifying [our]
proposal" 2 insofar as this negative judgment proceeds from his
Schumpeterian views. Of course, we have fallen short if elections are not to
be conceived as modes of self-government by private citizens, but as ran-
dom shocks that disrupt the ambitions of tyrannizing elites. But as the cur-
rent and continuing agitation over campaign reform suggests, most
Americans are not quite willing to accept Ferejohn's reductionist concep-
tion of democracy-at least not quite yet.
19. Ferejohn, supra note 15, at 702.
20. See, e.g., JOSEPH SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY chs. 21-22
(1942); William H. Riker, LIBERALISM AGAINST POPULISM: A CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE
THEORY OF DEMOCRACY AND THE THEORY OF SOCIAL CHOICE ch. 1 (1982).
21. See ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 2; BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, WE THE
PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS (1998); see also ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE, supra note 1.
22. Ferejohn, supra note 15, at 703.
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We do not dismiss anxieties about citizen competence and will take
them up shortly.23 For now, it is more important to distinguish criticisms
that, like those of Ferejohn and Strauss, undermine the very foundation of
citizen sovereignty from those that accept the sovereignty framework and
try to consider how it may be realized practically.
C. Equality
A surprising feature of this Symposium is the participants' failure to
talk much about the value of political equality-perhaps, as Karlan sug-
gests, because "the discussion of equality in the political process is already
so well developed."24 Nevertheless, we hazard a few words on this vast
topic. It is an essential part of our case for the new paradigm, despite
Ferejohn's surprising claim that it is "easy to characterize [our] reforms as
an effort to smuggle in a system of public funding under the guise of
reducing the incidence of corruption."25 Since we are not in the smuggling
business, we want to be absolutely clear: The case for Patriot dollars has
almost nothing to do with the elimination of corruption and everything to
do with the pursuit of citizen sovereignty and political equality.26
We do not treat these last two terms as synonyms. Citizens are sover-
eign when each has some say in determining the shape of the campaign
debate and the nature of the final decision. Citizens are equal when they
have an equal say.
So conceived, the new paradigm falls far short of political equality-
and not only because we allow the rich to continue giving large sums
through the secret donation booth.27 Campaign cash is only one of many
resources that count in politics, and the inequalities prevailing in the
distribution of all the others remain untouched by our proposal. To take an
obvious example, most poor people have never received the high-quality
education that should be the birthright of every American citizen. Can they
hope to participate as real equals in American politics? The only plausible
answer is "no." This will not change anytime soon, and it is utopian to aim
for real political equality.
Nevertheless, it is realistic to hope for a balance of power between
social elites and ordinary citizens that gives the latter greater control over
23. See infra Part I.E.
24. Karlan, supra note 9, at 708.
25. Ferejohn, supra note 15, at 688.
26. We hedge a bit because the massive increase in public funding entailed by our program will
normally reduce the marginal benefit a candidate obtains from a given private contribution. And, if the
prospect of a private gift of, say, $20,000 represents a smaller share of a candidate's entire campaign
fund, he will normally be less willing to accept it if it is tied to an explicit or implicit quid pro quo.
In contrast to Patriot, the case for the secret donation booth does heavily depend on the public
interest in corruption control.
27. But note that we also take steps to assure that private giving will not be more than one-third
of the total.
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their ultimate destiny. For more than a century, this rough balance was
achieved through the American invention of mass political parties, where
ordinary people made a big difference in selecting party candidates and
shaping the dominant issues for the campaign. These old-fashioned politi-
cal parties are largely a thing of the past,28 and money counts for much
more in an age of mass media. The drift to plutocracy is plain enough for
those who care to notice. The rise of the "money primary" allows political
novices to buy their way into office by hiring fancy consultants for a mas-
sive media blitz.
29
The new paradigm offers some practical tools for confronting the
growing imbalance between the elites and citizens. In Strauss's evocative
phrase, it promises to "democratize the money primary" by making big
contributors less powerful and by making ordinary citizens a potential
force in funding nominees.3° Our proposal is likely to reduce dramatically
the 30% of all Political Action Committee ("PAC") giving, supplied by
corporate PACs in 2000 (and the further 22.5% contributed by PACs con-
nected to trade, membership, and health organizations such as the
American Medical Association and trial lawyers). 31 In addition, the mas-
sive influx of Patriot dollars will mute the impact of political contributions
from rich people.
During the final election campaign, the large pool of Patriot dollars
gives candidates powerful new incentives. If they hope to fish successfully
in this pool, they had better focus on issues of genuine concern to the ma-
jority of citizens. The present system provides different incentives. If can-
didates want to keep the dollars flowing, they have good reason to focus on
the concerns of the big givers and create media packages that allow them to
sell big-money issues for mass consumption.
Of course, the new paradigm will not entirely eliminate these incen-
tives, since big givers can continue giving through the donation booth. But
the system will dramatically change the relative proportion of the funds
flowing from economic elites versus the general public, and therefore the
balance of campaign discourse. From the vantage of utopian egalitarians,
this shift in political concern may seem a minor matter; yet it makes a big
28. See generally DAVID R. MAYHEW, PLACING PARTIES IN AMERICAN POLITICS (1986).
29. As we noted in Voting With Dollars, Steve Forbes, Ross Perot, Michael Huffington, and John
Corzine "have together spent a quarter of a billion dollars out of their own pockets in recent races."
ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 13, at 64. And Senator Corzine succeeded in spending an average of
$37.15 for every vote that was cast for him in the 2000 senatorial race. The Center for Responsive
Politics, Money Wins Big in 2000 Elections: Top Spenders Capture 9 out of 10 Races, at
http://www.opensecrets.org/pressreleases/Post-Election2000.htm (Nov. 8, 2000). Our program provides
new (and constitutional) mechanisms that make it more difficult for billionaire candidates to succeed in
their oligarchic projects. See ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 13, at 64.
30. See Strauss, supra note 3, at 738.
31. See ACKERMAN & AYREs, supra note 13, at 171-72.
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difference for practical democrats concerned with halting the evident drift
to plutocracy before it generates overwhelming momentum.
D. Responsiveness
Of course, our scheme will not work unless citizens use their new-
found power over Patriot dollars. The overwhelming majority will simply
refuse our invitation to vote with their dollars and allow their Patriots to
expire on election day. We can't know until we try, but we believe that tens
of millions will heed the call of Patriot dollars and use them to help shape
the course of public debate. 2
Our commentators seem to agree-at least, they don't spend much
time wringing their hands over the prospects of truly massive abstention.
Instead, they have a lot of interesting things to say about the ways in which
Patriot dollars will change existing forms of political participation in
America for better or worse. On balance, we remain convinced that Patriot
finance will greatly improve the extent to which the political system re-
sponds to the changing interests and values of ordinary Americans.
In his thoughtful appraisal, Briffault recognizes many advantages to
the Patriot proposal but suggests that we have underplayed important nega-
tives. He contrasts our proposal to traditional subsidies that go directly to
well-established political parties or candidates and finds that "Patriot
money would ... be far less effective than flat grants in promoting
electoral competition and reducing the burdens of fundraising."33
Briffault has reached these conclusions too hastily. He has ignored the
crucial role that political parties and interest groups will play in the process
of Patriotic fundraising. Many citizens will not give to candidates directly
but will give to one or another organization that offers itself as a "broker."
They can send their Patriots to the Republicans or Democrats, the Friends
of the Earth, or the National Rifle Association and leave it to them to iden-
tify the candidates who will use the money to the greatest effect.
These brokers will try to identify incumbents with a tenuous hold on
their districts. Having pinpointed a prime prospect, they will pour Patriot
money into the vulnerable district on behalf of an attractive challenger, and
it will be easier to find high-quality challengers once they are assured ade-
quate campaign funds. Indeed, "brokers" may often take the lead in recruit-
ing such candidates. At the same time, many incumbents will find that the
secret donation booth will reduce the flow of large private gifts from grate-
ful contributors they have served over the years.
This means that, contrary to Briffault's suggestion, the new paradigm
will generate many more competitive races than would a standard subsidy
32. Our model statute takes special steps to offset the dangers of low levels of participation if this
should prove particularly serious during the early years of the new program. See id. at 223.
33. Briffault, supra note 12, at 674.
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scheme. Under the latter formula, the two major party candidates receive
the same number of dollars in subsidy, regardless of incumbency. Since
challengers typically need much more money to fight their uphill battle, the
subsidy approach provides a great deal of security for incumbents-
especially those who would be targeted as vulnerable by brokers under the
new paradigm.
Briffault's second big complaint requires refinement before it can be
analyzed. He says that the new paradigm will fail to reduce the burden of
fundraising when compared to traditional subsidy schemes.34 A proper re-
sponse requires a distinction between two sorts of burdens-the burden on
the candidate and the burden on his organization. So long as Briffault's
subsidy scheme allows private fundraising, the new paradigm will reduce,
not increase, the personal burden on the candidate. The secret donation
booth undercuts the candidate's incentive to engage in long personal con-
versations with big donors to persuade them that he is a good political in-
vestment. Since the candidate can no longer know whether putative big
givers have actually carried through on promises made to him personally,
he will delegate more of the job to his fundraising staff. This will enable
him to devote personal time to more rewarding pursuits, such as reaching
out to mass constituencies and developing legislation.
Briffault is right to suggest that the new paradigm will increase the
workload on the candidates' staff,35 but the significance of this point can
readily be exaggerated. The traditional subsidy scheme merely requires a
bureaucrat to write out a single big subsidy check to a qualifying candidate.
In contrast, the Patriot program requires each campaign organization to
raise money in small bits, and this can be very expensive. But this
transaction-cost disadvantage dissolves when one considers how candi-
dates will go about raising Patriot funds. Rather than making personal ap-
peals to individuals for small chunklets of Patriot dollars, the candidate and
his organization will reach out to mass constituencies through advertising
on issues that will bring additional Patriot contributions. In short, the best
fundraising strategy will be effective political communication. Briffault
recognizes this point elsewhere when he remarks that the new paradigm
blurs the line between fundraising and political communication.36 We
would go further: it doesn't blur the line, it obliterates it entirely and
thereby eliminates the persuasiveness of Briffault's objection.
Finally, Briffault criticizes the new paradigm on the ground that it will
"reward early popularity."37 This is an odd objection when applied to the
primary phase of the electoral contest. We think it is a plus, not a minus,
34. Id. at 665-68.
35. Id. at 674.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 673.
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that our scheme allows serious candidates to raise substantial Patriot funds
while fringe candidates get little or nothing. In contrast, conventional sub-
sidy schemes give equal amounts of money to all primary candidates who
can jump over a low threshold of voter support. Since serious candidates
must share equally with the fringe, they typically get too little money to
run genuinely informative campaigns.
Briffault is on stronger ground when it comes to the fall election. A
major party nominee may be such a flop that his early failures to generate
Patriot funding may "snowball" to the point where he is virtually silenced
by his more popular opponent.
Snowballing will be a particular problem in some House districts
where, thanks to partisan gerrymandering, it is virtually impossible for a
challenger to deprive the incumbent of his seat. In such cases, the chal-
lenger will have trouble persuading party loyalists and organizational bro-
kers to send their Patriot dollars to his account rather than to other, more
competitive, districts. Briffault's point does apply here, but it seems wrong
to blame the new paradigm, rather than partisan gerrymandering, for the
resulting financial imbalance. In contrast, snowballs seem unlikely in more
competitive districts and in the contest for the presidency. Given large
numbers of party loyalists on both sides, as well as a host of brokering or-
ganizations, only a very unpopular candidate will have trouble raising
enough funds to make his case to the public. Moreover, if a political party
occasionally blunders and puts up a bad candidate in a competitive race,
why shouldn't it be punished financially? A devastating defeat may be the
only way to encourage the collective soul searching required to reorient a
party for victory in subsequent elections.
We concede that an occasional snowball may have an unfortunate ef-
fect, but this is a price worth paying for one of the new paradigm's greatest
virtues-responsiveness to voter interests and values.3" As candidates try to
define the big issues for their campaigns, they will be focusing on the bil-
lions of Patriot dollars held by American citizens. If they strike a respon-
sive chord amongst their constituents, they will strike it rich and maybe
win the election. Patriotic finance will constantly pressure candidates to
keep up with changing values and encourage creative acts of "issue entre-
preneurship." If candidates or parties manage to put a new issue on the
agenda that attracts widespread support, their efforts will be rewarded by a
sudden, and sometimes massive, flow of financial support.
Issue entrepreneurship can be a risky business; a flop can sharply re-
duce the flow of Patriot funds and lose the election. Nonetheless, the sys-
tem creates a powerful new incentive to keep searching the horizon, and
38. This is especially true when competitiveness is analyzed at a system level. Our book
repeatedly emphasizes that campaign finance regulation should not be driven by its effect on particular
races, but rather by its effect on the aggregate behavior of elected legislators.
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when an issue entrepreneur strikes it rich, he will not be the only one who
benefits. His discovery will enrich the ongoing repertoire of political de-
bate. An entrepreneur's successes will soon define the issues taken up by
other candidates in other races in order to gain similar advantages in their
own campaigns.
Conventional forms of subsidy exert no similar pressure. Each serious
candidate gets the same amount of money, regardless of what she says and
does. In contrast, the pressure for entrepreneurship under the Patriot system
is never-ending. Suppose that candidates expect about 50% of the citizenry
to take the trouble to use their Patriot dollars during a presidential election,
the same proportion that goes to the polls on election day. If one of them
manages to define an issue that induces this proportion to move from 50%
to 60%, he may gain a substantial financial advantage down the home-
stretch. Once again, such a success will not only benefit the individual is-
sue entrepreneur, but the general good as well by drawing in millions of
citizens who would otherwise stand on the sidelines of a political conversa-
tion they find pointless.
Where we see a dynamic cycle of engaged conversation and broader
participation, Ferejohn glimpses a darker prospect: "Alienated, ignorant,
and irresponsible voters will ... form a fertile ecology. for the ideological
groups that will likely dominate the new landscape."39 He does not define
"ideology," but it seems to operate as a negative term in his lexicon. We
prefer a more neutral term, "public interest" groups, and define the concept
broadly to include the Sierra Club and the National Rifle Association as
well as interest groups focusing on bread-and-butter issues like "Citizens
for Lower Taxes" or "Americans United for a New Prescription Drug
Benefit!"
We see no reason to predict, a priori, that "alienated" and "ignorant"
citizens will give their Patriots to one kind of group rather than another or
that engaged and knowledgeable voters will systematically make different
choices. We suspect that the market share of different public interest
groups will rise and fall over time as the nation confronts different
challenges and as values evolve. If we shift the focus from particular
groups to the entire political system, we think that there will be a strongly
positive effect. As politicians and groups compete more vigorously to
reach out to more voters, the proportion of "alienated" and "ignorant" citi-
zens will decline.
Ferejohn makes a second prediction. He thinks that Patriot finance
will promote single-issue groups at the expense of (multiple-issue) national
political parties.40 We are not so sure. The only certainty is that the national
parties will have greater incentives to reach out to ordinary citizens and try
39. Ferejohn, supra note 15, at 689.
40. Id. at 700-01.
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to persuade them to support the general political orientation denoted by
"Democrat" or "Republican" instead of lavishing their Patriot dollars on a
single cause. Rather than confidently predicting that the parties will fail in
this effort, we think that their success will vary over time. While
Democrats and Republicans will have a great incentive to elaborate a more
compelling political identity, it will be up to the general citizenry to make
the final decision, and different citizens will decide differently on different
occasions.
Undoubtedly, Ferejohn will be right some of the time, but will this be
a bad thing? As he notes, the national parties are relatively stronger nowa-
days than they were in the 1960s and 1970s.4 Is Congress producing better
legislation as a result? Ferejohn is right that the financial strength of na-
tional parties currently enables a narrowly divided Congress to pass highly
controversial legislation on a party-line basis. He implies that this is a good
thing, yet this is not obvious. To the contrary, the desirability of strong na-
tional parties is one of the great questions of American political science,
and serious scholars have differed on the correct answer for generations.4"
When national parties are weak, it falls to individual congressmen and
senators to aggregate conflicting interests, and weigh whether they should
lose a potential Patriot contribution from the Sierra Club to gain Patriots
from Citizens for Energy Independence. When national parties are strong,
it will be the congressional leadership and the president who will play a
larger role in this aggregation process.
There are pros and cons to both arrangements.43 Rather than plunking
down hard on one side, we think it wiser to rely on our generalized
commitment to the value of responsiveness to carry the day. Let citizens
decide, with their Patriot dollars, on the relative strength of parties and sin-
gle-interest groups. American history reveals that our system can operate
under both conditions-with triumphs and failures occurring during peri-
ods of weak and strong party control.
The crucial question in each political era is how much the political
protagonists attend to the interests of big money, and how much to the
41. Id. at 697-98.
42. Compare Am. Pol. Sci. Ass'n, Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System: A Report of
the Committee on Political Parties, 44 AM. POL. SCI. REV. i (No. 3. Part 2. Supp. 1950) (advocating
strong parties), with ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY (1957) (emphasizing
weak linkages between citizen preferences and parties), and KENNETH A. SHEPSLE & MARK S.
BONCHEK, ANALYZING POLITICS: RATIONALITY, BEHAVIOR, AND INSTITUTIONS (1997) (suggesting
possible efficiencies of weak party systems).
43. See, e.g., JOHN H. ALDRICH, WHY PARTIES? THE ORIGIN AND TRANSFORMATION OF
POLITICAL PARTIES IN AMERICA (1995); JOHN F. BIBBY & L. SANDY MAISEL, TWO PARTIES-OR
MORE? THE AMERICAN PARTY SYSTEM (1998); MAURICE DUVERGER, POLITICAL PARTIES: THEIR
ORGANIZATION AND ACTIVITY IN THE MODERN STATE (1969); THEODORE J. LOWI & JOSEPH
ROMANCE, A REPUBLIC OF PARTIES? DEBATING THE TWO-PARTY SYSTEM (1998); Theodore J. Lowi,
Toward a More Responsible Three-Party System: The Mythology of the Two-Party System and the
Prospects ]br Reform, 16 POL. SCI. 699 (1983).
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concerns of ordinary voters. The Patriot program pushes the balance deci-
sively in the direction of popular responsiveness. The billions of Patriot
dollars will create new incentives for issue entrepreneurship. As politicians
continuously search the horizon for rising concerns of the electorate, they
will occasionally strike it rich. They also will improve the responsiveness
of the entire system as more cautious candidates follow their lead.
No less important, the entrepreneurial dynamic will constantly en-
courage politicians to reach out to the tens of millions of Americans who
currently don't care enough to participate. By framing issues that engage
their interest, issue entrepreneurs will help cure one of the greatest embar-
rassments of American democracy, its low voter turnout.
These are very substantial advantages. Compared to them, our critics'
objections seem like pretty small change.
E. Citizen Engagement
Our first four principles-political autonomy, citizen sovereignty,
equality, and responsiveness-converge on a final objective. We hope to
increase the number of Americans who take their citizenship seriously and
cast their ballots in a relatively considered fashion. Our basic strategy is to
harness market forces to further the cause of civic engagement. By provid-
ing each registered voter with fifty Patriots, we give candidates and politi-
cal organizations a powerful new economic incentive to connect with
ordinary citizens. If they do not succeed, their rivals may scoop up the
lion's share of Patriots. In making their particular efforts, each competitor
will create public goods that will enrich the civic quality of the entire sys-
tem. They will not only generate a richer informational environment on
more issues of mass concern. They also will try to convince Patriot holders
that their political opinions are important, not only on election day, but
during the entire campaign period.
The intense struggle for Patriot dollars can't help but encourage ordi-
nary people to consider the candidates' competing claims more carefully as
they ponder their choices. The ultimate civic payoff should be measured in
terms of the hundreds of millions of conversations about the best way to
spend Patriots. Call this our "civic market strategy": the aim is to make
markets work to support, not undermine, citizenship consciousness.
This strategy will not yield anything like the ideally informed and
publicly concerned citizens of utopian democratic theory. Our success
should be measured on the margins. It will suffice if Patriot decreases the
number of citizens who abstain entirely from the electoral process and in-
creases the civic seriousness of those who already vote on election day.
Given the shockingly low voter turnout and poor information levels
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prevailing in America," marginal gains are important even though they fall
painfully short of the political ideal. Progress toward better citizenship will
come, if it comes at all, in small steps. No single reform can hope to
achieve anything like a great leap forward, and many more reforms are re-
quired before the country reaches a satisfactory state of affairs.45 But the
slow and difficult nature of progress doesn't justify do-nothing passivity.
Political autonomy, citizen sovereignty, equality, responsiveness, and
engagement: In discussing these values, we have assumed that our pro-
gram can operate as planned under real-world conditions. Although our
commentators do not seriously question the feasibility of Patriot financing,
they are more skeptical about the secret donation booth. Our next task is to
take these doubts seriously.
II
WHO'S AFRAID OF ANONYMITY?
Our commentators worry that anonymity either cannot be maintained
or will produce bad consequences. 6 As we consider whether anonymity
could usefully be applied to campaign contributions, keep in mind how
unthinkable it would be to move away from ballot secrecy. Although
Karlan offers a host of rationales for questioning our collective commit-
ment to the secret ballot, even she does not seriously propose abandoning
it.
A. Is Anonymity Achievable?
Karlan doubts that the donation booth will actually work. She chal-
lenges our claim that "'[t]housands may flock to the candidate to promise
gargantuan sums which never arriye through the blind trust."' 47 Why?
Because candidates will immediately find some of these "cheap talkers"
incredible. We agree that the poor or well-known Democrats will lose all
credibility if they claim to be big givers to the Republican Party. But many
44. See THOMAS E. PATTERSON, THE VANISHING VOTER: PUBLIC INVOLVEMENT IN AN AGE OF
UNCERTAINTY (2002).
45. As Pam Karlan notes, Bruce Ackerman and James Fishkin are working on a very different
proposal to achieve additional gains in civic competence. See Karlan, supra note 9, at 710 n.20. It
seems sensible to defer further elaboration until their book treating this proposal is published. See
Bruce Ackerman & James S. Fishkin, Deliberation Day, 10 J. POL. PHIL. 129, 129-52 (2002).
46. Before turning to the specifics of their concerns, we should try to shake off a certain status
quo bias. As Saul Levmore has noted, people tend to think of whatever regime they have, whether it be
anonymity or disclosure, as somehow natural:
It is common for a faculty member accustomed to open voting to deride secret ballots,
especially in votes on promotion, as cowardly and dangerously hospitable to inappropriate
motives, while faculty accustomed to closed voting abhor open voting as an example of
overdelegation to committees and unsuitable empowerment of deans and regard it as adding
to the difficulty of maintaining standards of excellence.
Saul Levmore, The Anonymity Tool, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 2191, 2222-23 (1996).
47. Karlan, supra note 9, at 712 (quoting ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 13, at 28).
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thousands remain with the financial means and the political interest to
make such claims. We are a nation with more than a million millionaires.
And more than 200,000 people gave at least $1,000 to political candidates
in 1996.48
Karlan fails to recognize this point in her critique of our hypothetical
analysis of a Cadillac dealership forced to sell cars through a blind trust.49
According to her, Cadillac dealers know that only certain rich people are
interested in their cars. But so what? There are enough rich people for an
anonymity system to work to undermine a quid pro quo system. The deal-
ership would not hand over cars to Yugo owners who have said they paid
into the blind trust. But the dealership would quickly go out of business if
it gave existing Cadillac owners the right to get new cars in exchange for
an unverifiable claim that their check was in the mail to a blind trust ac-
count. Anonymity would have a similar disruptive impact on quid pro quo
deals in the political realm.
Or imagine what would happen if Stanford only accepted anonymous
donations." Perhaps it would dismiss Yalies who claimed to have given a
million dollar gift for the new Palo Alto gymnasium. But there would be
more than enough cheap-talking Stanford alums to make it very difficult
for the university to decide for whom to name the gym.
The university hypothetical hits upon another issue by underscoring
how much of charitable contributions are driven by third party status ef-
fects. People give to universities in large part as a way of showing off to
their classmates. Take away the named contribution list in the back of the
alumni newsletter, and contributions would plummet. The same holds true
for political contributors who are motivated by the chance to tell their bud-
dies that they spent the night in the Lincoln bedroom. Notwithstanding the
ability of candidates (or Cadillac dealerships or universities) to identify
those plausibly interested in contributing, there is still likely to be a
sufficient group, numbered in the thousands (but even the hundreds would
suffice), to disrupt access peddling and the market for influence.
Professor Briffault, in contrast, suggests that the number of cheap
talkers will be small not because candidates can identify and ignore im-
plausible claims, but because contributors will be unwilling to misrepresent
the amount of their gift. He claims that an effective anonymity regime
depends on a "culture of widespread mistrust" and that "[m]any donors are
honorable individuals and will do exactly what they say they will do."'"
We think the first claim is overstated, and the second ignores an important
48. See id. at 712-14 (disagreeing with ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 13, at 28, 251-52 n.8.).
49. See id at 713-14.
50. See Amihai Glazer & Kai A. Konrad, A Signaling Explanation for Charity, 86 AM. ECON.
REV. 1019, 1021 (1996) (noting that fewer than 1% of the donations to Yale Law School, Harvard Law
School, and Carnegie Mellon University are anonymous).
51. Briffault, supra note 12, at 660.
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point made by Strauss, who emphasizes the quasi-extortionate character of
many campaign contributions.52
First, consider that the secret ballot has been effective without creat-
ing a culture of widespread mistrust. The voting booth's ability to deter
vote buying does not depend on widespread lying; the mere possibility of
lying has been sufficient to deter political corruption. Instead of a culture
of distrust, the anonymity has given rise to a "don't ask, don't tell" norm
making it highly improper for a boss to ask an employee whether she voted
for Bush or Gore. The secret donation booth may well give rise to a similar
norm.
Second, what does honor demand in the extortion-like cases described
by Strauss? Even if candidates don't make explicit extortionate demands,
people may just assume that to receive fair treatment from an officeholder,
they must have contributed to her campaign. Or they may feel that they
have to contribute because their competitors are contributing, and if the
candidate prevails, she will, naturally enough, help the people who sup-
ported her. 3
These sorts of givers will see the donation booth as a much-needed
protection against political hold-ups. And if a candidate explicitly asks how
much they gave, they won't find it "dishonorable" to respond by exaggerat-
ing the size of their donation. 4 And of course, it will be very difficult for
candidates to discriminate accurately between these givers and their more
sincere and principled supporters.
Briffault raises a separate and more serious objection concerning pub-
lic perception. The public may fear that the secret donation booth isn't
working and that politicians and donors are actually penetrating the system
to make quid pro quo deals.55 In the shadow of the donation booth, will
ordinary folks know whether a candidate knows more than they do about
the identity of her biggest givers? Widespread public anxiety may be just
as corrosive to the democratic process as the fact of noncompliance itself.
Our first response is to recall the success of the secret ballot. Voting
secrecy has its drawbacks, but public fear about secret vote buying is not
one of them. Secondly, our system does allow the public to see the
proportion of total funds that come from private contributions and to learn
the total number of people who give $200 or more to each candidate. This
public information will put a real limit on the amount of potential corrup-
tion. We predict that the amount of private giving and particularly the
52. See Strauss, supra note 3, at 741.
53. Strauss, supra note 3, at 734.
54. Our proposal allows the blind trust to certify that individual donors have contributed at least
$200 to particular candidates, but forbids the trust to say how much more than this sum has been
provided. As a consequence, big donors can't credibly lie about whether they have given. At worst,
they can only exaggerate, claiming that they have given $20,000 when in fact their check was for $201.
55. Briffault, supra note 12, at 663-665.
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amount of large gifts will decline under our system (even though we are
substantially increasing the contribution limits). Public confidence in a
candidate who receives, say, 10% to 20% of her contributions in big gifts is
likely to be greater than the confidence levels prevailing under the current
system, where candidates routinely raise more than 50% of their contribu-
tions in large gifts.56
The electorate is also at liberty to punish candidates who are dispro-
portionately funded with large private gifts. Such electoral punishments are
few and far between in the current system, where big money finances in a
sine qua non. With our program, a new ethos against fat-cat finance may
evolve. And while we did not emphasize this in our book, we believe that a
candidate should be allowed to instruct the blind trust to refuse any gifts
over some maximum amount. Candidates can then compete with one an-
other for the public trust by setting lower and lower limits on the size of
their biggest gifts.
57
Finally, we propose to diminish the perception problem further by
taking advantage of Briffault's constructive proposals. We believe that do-
nors have one legitimate concern about the donation booth. They may fear
that employees at the blind trust may take a check that they send to Gore
and credit it to Bush's account (or vice versa). To counter this fear, we re-
quired the blind trust to disclose publicly all donations ten years after the
election. Briffault is right to point to a tension between this effort to reas-
sure donors and our more fundamental objective: maintaining candidate
ignorance. And he is also right to suggest that technological advances will
make it possible to adopt better methods of reassurance which do not re-
quire this trade-off.
As he points out, new technologies will allow individual donors to
verify their gifts immediately while keeping candidates in the dark. The
brave new world of encrypted digital signatures will permit donors to trace
the flow of their contributions through a blind trust to the account of
56. See The Center for Responsive Politics, The Big Picture: The Money Behind the 1998
Elections - Small Donations / Large Individual Donors / PACs, at http://www.opensecrets.org/pubs/
bigpicture2000/overview/donations.ihtml (last visited Feb. 28, 2003) ("While the biggest number of
contributions always comes from small donors, the biggest proportion of dollars comes from donors
with deeper pockets. In 1997-98, federal candidates and parties raised nearly $464 million from donors
giving $200 or more. A slight majority- 54%-went to Republican candidates and committees.").
57. In his 1992 bid for President, Jerry Brown accepted only contributions less than or equal to
$100. City of Oakland Office of the Mayor, Biography, at http://www.oaklandnet.com/
govemment/mayor/biography.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2003). In 2000, Ralph Nader employed a
related strategy, accepting only donations from individuals and limiting givers to a maximum of
$1,000. The strategy appears to have worked well for Nader, allowing him to raise almost $5 million
over the course of his campaign. See Eun-Kyung Kim, Nader's Slow Climb to $5 Million, ASSOCIATED
PRESS NEWSWIRES, Oct. 12, 2000, reprinted as Eun-Kyung King, Nader Turns Trickle of Donations
Into $4.7 Million War Chest, at http://www.commondreams.org/headlines/101300-0l.htm (last
modified Oct. 13, 2000).
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particular campaigns-but simultaneously block the campaign's ability to
determine the identity of the contributor. 8
B. Is Anonymity Desirable?
Karlan provides a gripping critique of the secret ballot. We learn how
the Australian ballot hurt the politically dispossessed, how it entrenched
existing political parties, and how John Stuart Mill believed that it reduced
voter accountability. One can even go further to suggest that it might have
also disrupted the rising power of unions.59
But in concocting this tasty dish of historical revisionism, let's keep
our eye on the larger menu. Karlan's story is still a story about the power-
fully disruptive impact of anonymity. Whatever motives impelled the push
to secrecy in the nineteenth century, Karlan has not suggested a twenty-
first-century scenario under which a secret donation booth would disadvan-
tage the subordinated classes. To the contrary, an effective system will al-
most certainly dampen the political power of the rich and thereby increase
the incentives for wider popular politics.
At the end of the day, Karlan does not propose a return to the "good
old days" when party bosses could tell how each voter cast his ballot. She
simply uses the history of voting secrecy as a jumping off point to evaluate
the unintended consequences of donation secrecy. Of course, the search for
unintended consequences is never-ending. But those identified by the
commentators do not provide persuasive reasons for abandoning anonym-
ity.
1. Loss of Voter Information
Several of the commentators, including Karlan, point to the fact that
voters will lose some potentially useful information when they no longer
can tell whether a candidate took money from trial lawyers or tobacco
58. See ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 13, at 99. We are indebted to Briffault for encouraging
us to take the idea more seriously. We are especially heartened that more tech-savvy researchers have
recently explored how encryption technologies could be used in place of our proposed snail-mail-blind-
trust-cum-delayed-auditing alternative. See Matt Franklin & Tomas Sander, Deniable Payments and
Electronic Campaign Finance, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE TENTH CONFERENCE ON COMPUTERS,
FREEDOM, AND PRIVACY: CHALLENGING THE ASSUMPTIONS 67 (Lorrie Faith Cranor ed., 2000),
available at www.cfp2000.org/paper,/franklin.pdf.
59. lan Ayres & Jeremy Bulow, The Donation Booth: Mandating Donor Anonymity to Disrupt
the Market for Political Influence, 50 STAN. L. REV. 837, 840 n.9 (1998) (citing MICHAEL E. McGETT,
THE DECLINE OF POPULAR POLITICS: THE AMERICAN NORTH 1865-1928 12 (1986), and Walter Dean
Burnham, The Changing Shape of the American Political Universe, 59 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 7 (1965)):
The thesis that the Australian ballot was adopted in order to deter vote buying specifically-
and cleanse the political system generally-is hotly contested. An alternative interpretation is
that these voting reforms were motivated, at least in part, to dampen mass political activism.
The "spectacle" of lines of voters marching to the polls with colored ballots in hand might not
have indicated that their votes were bought, but instead that their votes were not for sale-a
symbol of the solidarity between voters and labor or other mass political movements.
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interests. Even if the candidate cannot tell either, and is thus less suscepti-
ble to direct contributor influence, this loss of information may make it
more difficult for voters to assess where candidates really stand.
This is true, but it is a mistake to overstate the problem. The donation
booth disrupts voters' ability to make an ad hominem inference-such as,
if Jane Fonda gave to the campaign, the candidate must be a radical liberal.
But this type of inference is of limited value in a world in which voters can
look to the words and actions of the candidate herself. As noted in the
book, it should not be surprising that researchers to date have not been able
to uncover a single instance where "voting cues" about contributor identity
affected a candidate election (though researchers found such influences in
referenda over complicated ballot initiatives).6"
Under our system, voters will still have access to a great deal of in-
formation. They can, of course, listen to rival campaign promises and con-
sult the many sets of candidate ratings prepared by a host of interest groups
ranging from left to right. Consider also that many voters will send their
Patriot dollars to PACs established by interest groups, who will then send
the funds to their favored candidates. Since these PAC contributions will
be public, voters will know when the National Rifle Association or the
Sierra Club thinks that a particular candidate is particularly devoted to its
cause.
2. Out-of-State Patriot Gifts as a Cumulative Voting Mechanism
Karlan has helpfully suggested that we could alleviate part of the in-
formation loss by requiring the blind trust to disclose how much Patriot
money comes from in-state or out-of-state contributors. After reflection,
we don't agree-partly because of another benefit of our system, identified
by Karlan: its "cumulative voting" effect.
Thanks to Karlan, we now see that our system allows citizens not only
to cast traditional ballots in their own districts on election day, but also to
send their Patriot dollars to a candidate in a different district and thereby
"vote with their dollars" in a second electoral contest.6 This second or
"cumulative vote" effect ameliorates the present predicament of millions of
Democrats or Republicans trapped in congressional districts gerryman-
dered by their partisan opponents.62 While these members of a "permanent
60. See, e.g., ELISABETH R. GERBER, THE POPULIST PARADOX: INTEREST GROUP INFLUENCE
AND THE PROMISE OF DIRECT LEGISLATION (1999); see also ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 13. at
27.
61. Indeed, they can even send a few dollars to several candidates, although the symbolic effect
of dividing one's (small) number of Patriots amongst different candidates may undermine the citizen's
sense of efficacy. These adverse symbolic effects may be avoided if a citizen chooses to send her
Patriots to a party or interest group who then plays the role of a broker-sending Patriots to a large
number of races where the money can do the most marginal good.
62. The art of gerrymandering has become quite a science in this computer age, leading to a
sharp reduction in the number of competitive congressional districts. See, e.g., Kristen Silverberg, The
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minority" will be obliged to waste their "first vote," the new paradigm will
allow them to use their "second vote" to support a sympathetic candidate in
a closely fought race elsewhere.
The introduction of Patriot dollars does not cure the underlying ger-
rymandering abuses; this is beyond the power of any reform of campaign
finance. But it will provide millions of citizens with a new sense that the
electoral system responds to their concerns. Karlan makes her point in con-
nection with congressional races, but it can be extended to presidential
races as well, especially in the case of third-party candidacies.63 Consider
the plight of the Green Party voter considering her options in 2000. She
could vote for Ralph Nader in the hope that the Greens would get 5% of
the vote and thereby qualify for a substantial subsidy in the presidential
election of 2004.64 Alternatively, she could vote for Al Gore in the hope
that he would beat George W. Bush, thereby reducing the chance for a
Green Party subsidy in 2004. The Patriot option gives her a third
choice: donate Patriot dollars to Ralph Nader, but vote for Al Gore on
Election Day.
We embrace Karlan's "cumulative voting" effect, but her proposal to
disclose the source of Patriot money would detract from its benefits. Giv-
ing in-district voters this information simply permits them to retaliate
against out-of-district contributors, cheapening the value of their "second
vote." If Karlan is right in suggesting that Patriot provides a useful form of
cumulative voting, we don't see why she wants to undermine the feature
she especially values. After all, in-district voters retain the exclusive power
to decide their local races on election day; at the very best, out-of-district
donors are simply contributing to better information about the national im-
plications of local choice. This is a valuable enhancement of their power,
but a small one, and should not be diluted by selective informational sanc-
tions.
Illegitimacy of the Incumbent Gerrymander, 74 TEX. L. REV. 913, 924-25 (1996). Silverberg remarks
that:
An additional reason gerrymandering was less influential historically is that, without
advanced computer technology, line-drawers were unable to determine the precise effects of
their districting plans. ... Today, improved technology makes it possible for a member to
know the precise effects of every change in district lines. Census data improvements provide
detailed demographic information at the precinct level, and computer software utilized by
state redistricting committees permits individual legislators to arrange districts block-by-
block.... Members know how the changes will affect the racial and socio-economic
constituency of their districts and, most importantly, their own re-election chances.
Id. at 924 (citations omitted).
63. See Karlan, supra note 9, at 720-2 1. She also interestingly notes that Patriot giving can have
the effect of "creating a variant of the national presidential primary" in which voters from late primary
states have the ability to cast their financial vote earlier by contributing their Patriot dollars to the
candidate of their choice. Idat 719-20.
64. See I.R.C. § 9004(a)(2) (West 2002) (outlining the distribution of Presidential Election
Campaign Fund payments).
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C. Give Disclosure a Chance
Karlan's suggestions about out-of-district Patriots are part of a more
general theme emphasizing how better information helps empower the
electorate. She recognizes that the overwhelming majority of citizens don't
pay enough attention to notice who is giving how much to which political
candidates. She suggests, however, that this may be different in a Patriot
world. If Patriot succeeds in mobilizing a more active and engaged citi-
zenry, might not these newly energized citizens start to pay more attention
to big gifts of private money? In essence, she suggests that we should give
mandated disclosure for private finance another chance.
Karlan's point is analytically sound,65 but it supposes that our "civic
market strategy" will succeed beyond our fondest dreams. Given the low
levels of most citizens' engagement, it will be enough of a triumph if the
Patriot program generates more serious discussion of the issues without
motivating millions to engage in an accounting analysis of candidate reve-
nue flows.
Even if the program creates a truly engaged electorate, there will still
be many other data sources available for inspection by citizens. If they
want to learn an incumbent's position on big oil or big labor, they can sim-
ply look up her voting record; many credible challengers will also have
readily available track records. As Ferejohn emphasizes, the crucial con-
straint is not the availability of data, but the willingness of citizens to make
use of them.66 If our initiative pushes millions over this engagement bar-
rier-Karlan's critical assumption-it will still be easy for them to gain
access to other reliable information that can substitute for the gift-giving
data concealed by the secret donation booth.
Karlan's defense of mandated disclosure suffers from a final irony.
She has been a noteworthy proponent of the "hydraulic" thesis that likens
campaign reform to the task of damming the mighty Mississippi: particular
reforms will only divert the flow of funds to other points in the system,
where they will once again wreak havoc on the countryside.67 Given this
grim view, it is surprising that she fails to acknowledge the hydraulic prob-
lem with disclosure itself. If mandated disclosure were effective (either
65. Although Patriot voters are more likely to vote against candidates who depend heavily on big
private donations, we still do not think it is very likely to happen. When push comes to shove, it is hard
to vote (especially in the general election) for a candidate of a party with a wildly different political
view. And because campaign finance is embedded in a deeply competitive finance structure, it may
also be hard to find a clean party for which to vote. The Democrats say they raise so much soft money
because the Republicans do-and vice versa. At the end of the day, we still believe that an effective
system of anonymity is likely to deter a lot more (explicit and implicit) influence peddling than an
effective disclosure requirement--even taking into account the increased citizenship engagement
generated by the Patriot system.
66. Ferejohn, supra note 15, at 689.
67. See Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, The Hydraulics of Campaign Finance Reform,
77 TEX. L. REV. 1705 (1999).
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now or in the shadow of the Patriot system) in deterring influence ped-
dling, Karlan should argue that big givers will respond by hydraulically
shifting to independent issue advocacy and thereby avoid the need for dis-
closure. Indeed, to remain consistent, hard-core hydraulicists should argue
that mandated disclosure will have no effect-even in a world with a
highly informed electorate. But no scholar has ever raised a hydraulic con-
cern with mandated disclosure. In our minds, this is fairly strong proof that
no hard-core hydraulicists exist. Campaign laws, notwithstanding some
hydraulic shifting, can reduce the net flow of contributions. And if this is
true of mandated disclosure, it is also true of mandated anonymity.
CONCLUSION: A NEW PARADIGM?
Beyond their particular concerns, our commentators ask a larger ques-
tion: Do the particular parts of our scheme add up to a coherent whole, or
have they merely been scrambled together over lunch in New Haven?
As Ferejohn notes, both Patriot dollars and secret donations create
systems in which "the good money will help to drive out the bad money."68
And both seek to expand the range of accepted ideals of electoral fair-
ness: the secret ballot and "one person, one vote." But we have something
deeper in mind in merging our two proposals into a single paradigm.
For starters, we hope to transcend a familiar dichotomy. Policy talk
remorselessly explores the tensions between "state" and "market" and too
often loses sight of a more hopeful possibility-that we may use the tech-
niques of the marketplace to enhance civic values rather than destroy them.
Our new paradigm expresses this more constructive aspiration. Its reform
of both public finance and private giving seeks to preserve the great virtues
of the marketplace, but in ways that make it responsive to the demands of
ordinary citizens, not private power-holders. Rather than replace the mar-
ket with the command and control of bureaucrats, we seek to redesign the
market in ways that further democratic political values.
As Briffault rightly suggests, constructing a "civic marketplace" cer-
tainly does not imply the elimination of all bureaucracy. It may well re-
quire bureaucrats to become more technocratically sophisticated if they
hope to discharge their new task: to assure the smooth functioning of civic
markets. The number of bureaucrats may increase, rather than decrease, as
the crude methods of command and control are displaced by new methods
of market management. The key to the paradigm shift is not the size of the
bureaucracy, but its mission. Our proposals, if fully implemented, aim to
devolve as much political power as possible to individual citizens and re-
quire individual candidates to respond to citizen demands if they hope to
gather ongoing financial support.
68. Ferejohn, supra note 15, at 702.
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The systematic development of this theme is the hallmark of our new
paradigm, but we don't insist that all our proposals be adopted in a single
package. To the contrary, our initiative permits for step-by-step implemen-
tation. For example, one might introduce a system of Patriot finance on the
public side while retaining a traditional system of controls over private giv-
ing. Or one might introduce the secret donation booth on the private side,
and create a traditional public subsidy providing funds directly to parties or
candidates without giving individual citizens a say.69 Both partial reforms
represent an important victory for the new paradigm, even though each
falls short of its full realization.
This pragmatic openness to step-by-step reform represents a strength
of the new paradigm, not a sign of incoherence. But partial reforms do re-
quire special sophistication in institutional design. Reformers can't simply
throw elements from the new paradigm into more traditional structures and
hope for the best. They must think through the dynamics of particular hy-
brids and respond to potential pathologies. Particular care is required if the
partial reform focuses on the secret donation booth as a first priority. Ano-
nymity will predictably reduce the overall amount of private giving, from
$2.5 billion to all federal candidates in the 2000 elections, 70 to something
much lower. This decline is a source of concern. We reject the popular be-
lief that too much money is now pouring into politics.7' Compared to the
$13 billion spent on advertising by the auto industry in 1999,72 $2.5 billion
does not seem too much to pay for political communication.
Under the full-blown version of the new paradigm, the anticipated
decline in private giving is offset by the large increase in public funding
through Patriot. A partial reform with the same objective must combine the
secret donation booth with a traditional subsidy program that is big enough
to offset the anticipated reduction in private giving.
In glimpsing the prospect for partial reform, we do not advocate a go-
slow approach. To the contrary: the legislative window for serious reform
seems to open once or twice in a generation, and it would be foolish to re-
frain from making the most of the next opportunity. To prepare the
groundwork, we have proposed a model statute that elaborates the legal
infrastructure required for the comprehensive adoption of the new para-
digm. While we have been gratified by the thoughtfulness and seriousness
of the commentators in this Symposium, our only disappointment is that
none has chosen to scrutinize our model statute with care.
69. A particular state or city, for example, might also consider a pilot project.
70. Joseph E. Cantor, Campaign Finance in the 2000 Federal Elections: Overview and
Estimates of the Flow of Money, 2001 CONG. RES. SERVICE REP. RL30884, available at
http://www.cnie.org/nle/crsreports/risk/rsk-57.cfm (published Mar. 16, 2001, accessed Oct. 18, 2002).
71. See ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 13, at 85.
72. Seeid. at 261 n.28.
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Such a critique is an absolute necessity before the new paradigm
moves forward. Our statute undoubtedly contains serious mistakes and im-
perfections, and we cordially invite readers of this Symposium to take up
the task of critique, however damaging it may prove to our budding reputa-
tions as legislative draftsmen!
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